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LAN D AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME II

1967

NUMBER I

This student article, which won the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation Prize for research and scho!arship in 1966, is presented
to express a viewpoint concerning the importance of the vital natural
resource of oil shale and its proposed development. The author
outlines in detail the past and current situations with respect to the
development of this resource and submits that there is no federal
policy concerning oil shale development. Mr. Dominick presents a
comprehensive analysis of the many problems Congress will have to
consider when it takes up the task of establishing leasing procedures
for the future commercial development of federal oil shale lands.

OIL SHALE-THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY
David D. Dominick*
INTRODUCTION

"O

IL Shale!" is a cry that is firing the imaginations
of many people today. It is a cry not unlike that of

the forty-niners who staked their hopes on the promise of
"gold in them hills" over a century ago. Both cries remind
us that it is America's natural resources which have made her
the wealthiest nation in the world.
Oil shale has come to represent a special hope for the
people of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah. For in these three
states lies a tremendous, but as yet unused, natural resource.
By some estimates there are 1.5 trillion barrels of oil located
in the Green River Formation of Colorado alone. It is estimated that 280 billion barrels of oil' could be recovered from
the richer Colorado formations by using present technology.
Compare this to the other known reserves of crude oil-31
billion barrels-in the United States. The potential value
of shale oil is indeed staggering. Recoverable oil in the shale
* Legislative Assistant for Milward L. Simpson, U.S. Senate, Washington,

D.C.; B.A. 1960, Yale University; J.D. 1966, University of Colorado; member Wyoming and Colorado bars.
1. "Shale Oil: From Potential to Production," Speech by C. E. Reistle, Jr.,
chairman of the Board, Humble Oil and Refining Co., before the 95th
annual meeting, AIME, New York, N.Y., March 1, 1966.
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deposits of the Green River Formation has been valued at
$2,577,000,000,000.2

Yet development of this resource is still only a hope. A
century ago the forty-niners sought their gold free from
any government direction or control. At that time the "freeminer" tradition prevailed. But today a full-scale oil shale
industry cannot come into being without the formation of a
national policy permitting the commercial leasing of federal
oil shale lands. Approximately 72 per cent of the oil shale
acreage in Colorado is in the federally owned public domain,
and this federal land contains the richest portion of the
Green River Formation, containing approximately 85 per
cent of the formation's known oil shale reserves.' Because
of the great expense of entry into this new industry, private
enterprise needs some assurance that these reserves will be
made available for commercial development. Thus, the fed2.

OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, p. 65, March 9, 1964.

3.

Estimates vary as to the proportion of federal ownership depending upon
the geographic limits used in defining the Green River Formation. John
B. Tweedy, counsel for The Oil Shale Corporation (TOSCO), (speaking at
the University of Colorado Law School in November, 1965) estimates that
64% of the surface containing 84% of the oil reserves of the Green River
Formation lies in the Public Domain, with 21.8% of the surface containing
10% of the reserves on patented lands, and 13.5% of the surface containing
4.9% of the reserves on unpatented and presently contested lands.
In Senate Hearings it was claimed that approximately "70% of the
deposits in the Green River formation, containing some 80% of the oil is
on land owned by the Federal Government." Hearings on Oil Shale Before
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1965).
The Department of Interior, reporting on the oil shale policy problem
said:
To date, investigations of Utah's oil-shale deposits have not
been nearly as comprehensive as those of the Colorado deposits,
and the deposits in Wyoming have been explored least of all ....
Of the entire 1,300,000 acres of land in the oil-shale area
in Colorado, 582,000 acres (including Naval Reserves) are federally-owned, 380,000 are privately-owned, and 338,000 are lands
in unpatented mining claims. Approximately 1,000,000 acres are
underlain by oil-shale deposits and the remainder is contiguous
non-shale bearing land, principally the areas of stream valleys
between oil-shale outcrops. Virtually all of the central portion
of the Piceance Creek Basin is federally-owned land. Federal oil
shale averaging at least 25 gallons per ton and 15 feet or more
thick probably average about 1,000 feet in thickness, where the
shale of this grade on privately-owned land probably averages
a little over 100 feet.
Of this previously mentioned 1.3 trillion barrels of oil in
deposits containing 10 gallons or more of oil in the Piceance
Creek Basin the privately-owned oil shale represents about 100
billion barrels of shale oil and the unpatented mining claims
represent about 100 billion barrels. The remaining lands are federally-owned and contain deposits of about 1.1 trillion barrels in
place. Based upon a shale grade of 25 gallons per ton the oil
potential would be half of these quantities.
DEP'T. INTERIOR SyNposis, THE OIL SaAT POLICY PROBLEM 21-22 (1964).
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eral government holds the key to unlocking the benefits of
this great resource.
Oil shale has recently received increasing attention in
the press,4 in the courts5 and in Congress.' Such attention
is even reaching the proportions of sensationalism. In the
first session of the present 89th Congress Senator Douglas
of Illinois introduced a measure which read: "A Bill to
Retire the National Debt with Royalties from Publicly-owned
This proposal has predictably enraged
Oil Shale Land.'
many in the western states.'
As a result, there is an increased public awareness that,
while this natural resource awaits development, clearer and
clearer battle lines are being drawn between "Big Business"
and "Big Government." Representatives of the petroleum,
mining and chemical industries are asking that private enterprise be given the opportunity to develop oil shale.' Others
suggest that oil shale should be developed, if at all, by a
0
governmentally owned and operated monopoly.'
The federal oil shale lands are presentely under the
administration of the Department of Interior. Disposition
and leasing of these lands could be done today by the Secretary of Interior. But the prospects for such affirmative
action by him are poor. "Delay" has been the only recogniz4. Duscha, "Bonanza in Colorado-Who Gets It?," Atlantic Monthly, Mar., 1966.
5. The legal status of unpatented and administratively contested oil shale
claims made under the Federal mining laws is being adjudicated in several
cases presently pending before Judge Doyle of the Federal District Court,
Denver, Colorado. The principle "test" case is The Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall,
Civil Docket No. 8680, which is now in the pre-trial stage. This case, along
with numerous similar ones accompanying it in the District Court, seeks
a mandamus directing the Secretary of the Interior to discharge his duties
under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and to withdraw invalid administrative decisions cancelling rights to, or denying patents to, unpatented
claims. Alternatively the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment interpreting
the mining laws. Defendant's motion to dismiss has been denied. See also,
Reidy, Do Unpatented Mining Claims Exist?, 43 DENVER L.J. 9 (1968);
and Lohr, Conclusiveness of United States Oil Shale Placer Mining Claim
Patents, 43 DENvER L.J. 35 (1966).
6. 112 CoNc. RE . 4901 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1966) (remarks of Senator Dominick).
Also, Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3.
7. S. 2708, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
8. Wyoming State Tribune, Oct. 25, 1965, (editorial), p. 5.
9. Reistle, supra note 1.
10. Duscha, asupra note 4.
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to come out of the Interior Department in

It is this writer's opinion that such delay should no
longer be condoned and that a national oil shale policy should
be formulated as soon as possible. But the public would be
foolish to hope and expect that such a policy will ever be
forthcoming from the Executive Branch of the federal government, in general, or from the present Administration, in
particular. Rather, oil shale is a problem for the legislature.
It is Congress which now holds the key to oil shale development.
This paper will examine the role of the federal government in the formulation of a national oil shale policy. The
formulation of any such policy now, however, must take into
account past events and past policies. In this regard, Part
One of this paper will be a historical review of government
control in the petroleum industry as a whole. Then, Part
Two of the paper will describe the oil shale situation as it
presently exists and will outline the various questions of
policy which must be considered by Congress.
Some of these questions concerning the future of oil
shale are extremely complex and have proved difficult even
to define in the past. 2 But this problem is aggravated by the
fact that many who have successfully opposed"3 oil shale
development in the past have never been required to make
public the real reasons for their opposition. To date, those
who favor oil shale development have been only able to guess
at the possible rationale of their opponents. This paper
attempts to force any such rationale into the open.
Perhaps those who have inhibited oil shale development
thus far-while preaching the "new economics "-have
11. See Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 36. See Ely in Conservation of Oil and Gas, ABA SECT. M & NRL 303 (Sullivan ed. 1958). See
also, The Denver Post, Mar. 20, 1965, "The Dispute Over Oil Shale," p. 9,
where James H. Smith, Jr., of Aspen, Colorado, a nationally recognized
leader in economic development, decries the delay in the development of
oil shale.
12. Mock, The Oil Shale Advisory Board, 43 DENVER L.J. 47, 70 (1966).
13. See Duscha, supra note 4. See also the Individual Views of J. K. Galbraith
in the INTERIM REPORT OF THE OIL SHALE ADVISORY BOARD TO THE SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR 20 (Feb. 1965)

(transmitted by letter of chairman, Joseph

L. Fisher, Feb. 15, 1965). Reproduced in this issue of the REVIEW supra p. 50.
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actually feared that to move ahead with this resource development would be to dangerously "rock the boat." Perhaps
they fear upsetting the uneasy balance between "Big Business," particularly as represented by the petroleum industry,
and "Big Government" as it is being practiced by the present
Administration. Perhaps the opponents fear that the creation
of a private oil shale industry might weaken the government's
present attempts to assume more and more control in such
areas as the oil import program, anti-trust and interstate
commerce regulation, and federal land control.
But in each of these areas, the exercise of federal power
cannot be justified simply for its own sake. Policy can only
be formed after an examination of the merits. Those advocating the development of oil shale should be given the opportunity to show that such resource utilization, under proper
government regulation, would be in the best interests of the
nation. Those who propose such development by private enterprise have a right to demand good reasons from their
opposition, on a point-for-point basis, why such development
should not proceed. The burden now should be shifted to
those who would obstruct oil shale development.
There are those who have been critical in the past of
the petroleum industry as a whole.'" But such antagonism
should not be allowed to prevent the birth of a new industry.
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that an oil shale industry, if and when it is allowed to come into being, will be a
"new business." And while problems will be cited in Part
One which have traditionally plagued the federal government
in its efforts to regulate the petroleum industry in the past,
the government now has an opportunity to create original
answers with regard to a new oil shale industry. If there is
cooperation between the representatives of private industry
and the Department of Interior in seeking these answers,
then Congress will be greatly aided in its future policy
formulations.

14.

Galbraith, Individual Views, INTERIM
BOARD, supra note 13, at 21, 22.

REPORT OF THE OIL SHALE ADVISORY
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I

PART ONE
A

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL

IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

The petroleum industry (the natural gas industry will
not be 'discussed in this paper) is unique among the major
businesses of this country in that it has enjoyed comparative
freedom from direct federal regulation. In the first place,
federal anti-trust legislation has had little restrictive effect
upon the exploration, production and refining phases of the
petroleum industry (although retailing of oil products has
come under some anti-trust litigation in recent years). Secondly, the domestic production of crude oil has been regulated
by so-called "conservation statutes" of state, rather than
federal, government. And finally, special note should be
taken of the fact that less than 5 per cent of the petroleum
produced in this country has been subject to the federal
mineral and land laws.
On the other hand, the federal government is imposing
very important indirect controls over the petroleum industry
through the exercise of its national defense and foreign commerce powers.
Part One of the paper will discuss all these forms of
government control in the belief that each must be considered
by Congress in the formulation of any future oil shale policy.
It should be remembered that none of these controls
are absolute and all are subject to change. Therefore, the
problems of federalism will also play a part in any policy
considerations. Relationships between state and federal governments and between private industry and these governments must always be taken into account. Critics of the
petroleum industry argue for increased federal control over
that industry in the future. On the other hand, oil-pro'ducing
states have resisted such a move and seek to preserve the
regulatory powers which have been traditionally reserved
to them. These problems of federalism will be of great
significance to an emerging oil shale industry.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/3
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A. Federal versus State Powers
1. Federal Anti-Trust Regulations
The early history of the oil industry was marked by
severe competition. Large combinations exercised a monopolistic control through their ownership of refineries and oil
pipelines. Finally, the great Standard Oil Trust of John
D. Rockefeller was dissolved by Sherman Act prosecution
in 1911.15
Since that time, there has been only minimal anti-trust
regulation over the exploration, production and refining
phases of the petroleum industry. 6
2. Demand Estimates and Production Control Under State
"Conservation Statutes"
As was indicated at the outset of Part One, the production of crude oil is presently being controlled by state
governments."
It is due to what some describe as an "unfortunate legal
accident" that President Coolidge was stymied in 1924 in
his attempts to establish a Federal Oil Conservation Board.
For during the early stages of the development of the oil
industry it was an accepted constitutional principle that the
production of oils lay outside the purview of the interstate
commerce clause of the federal constitution. Meanwhile, and
as early as 1914, oil-producing states had passed prorationing
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. In the 1950's, some vertically integrated major oil companies were obliged
to accept consent decrees which were based on charges of violations of both
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act at all levels of the companies' operations. On the production levels the decrees generally enjoined "the operation
of agreements among the consenting defendants to control crude production
for the purpose of fixing prices, and similar agreements among themselves
fixing prices to be paid for crude oil or charged for refined products."
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, Civil No. 11584-C, S.D.
Cal., May 12, 1950; United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, TRADE
69399 (S. D. Cal. June 19, 1959).
REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.)
17. The most recent Congressional approval of the Interstate Oil Compact is
to be found in Pub. L. No. 86-143, Aug. 7, 1959, 73 Stat. 290 (1959).
18. By contrast, the natural gas industry did not begin to flourish until World
War II, at which time it was held-from its inception-to be subject to
the Interstate Commerce power of the federal government. That power
has served to make the natural gas industry one of the most heavily
regulated enterprises of the present day. A discussion of this regulation,
and of the many acts and cases by which it has been imposed, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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conservation statutes which in the decades that followed
underwent a stormy history of attempted enforcements and
evasions. These state statutes provide that production quotas
may be placed on the oil wells of a state. The production
quotas are set on the basis of estimates of demands, and for
this reason critics have labeled the proration system as
being nothing short of "administrative price fixing." Nevertheless, in 1932, the Supreme Court overruled lower federal
court injunctions against the enforcement of these state
statutes and declared in Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n 9 that state prorationing statutes were constitutional."° Since that time the courts have universally upheld
the statutes as legitimate "conservation" measures.2 1
19.
20.

286 U.S. 210 (1932).
The Court upheld the Oklahoma market demand statute, attacked as repugnant to the due process and equal protection clause, as a reasonable exercise
of the state police power to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction, or waste.
One of the most outspoken critics of the oil industry as a whole, and
of national policies concerning it, has been Eugene Rostow in his book
A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY (1948). At page 29 of his
book Dean Rostow calls the conservation premise upon which the Champlin
case rests as "entirely untenable."
Nevertheless, as late as 1950, the Supreme Court has been unmoved
by such a point of view as advocated by Rostow. In Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950), the Court dismissed
the due process and equal protection issues in a case involving natural
gas, stating as follows:
It is now undeniable that a state may adopt reasonable regulations
to prevent economic and physical waste of natural gas. This court
has upheld numerous kinds of state legislation designed to curb
waste of natural resources and to protect the correlative rights
of owners through ratable taking, . . . or to protect the economy
of the state . . . . These ends have been held to justify control
over production even though the uses to which property may
profitably be put are restricted ....
Like any other regulation, a price-fixing order is lawful if
substantially related to a legitimate end sought to be attained ....
In the proceedings before the Commission in this case, there was
ample evidence to sustain its finding that existing low field prices
were resulting in economic waste and conducive to physical waste.
That is a sufficient basis for the orders issued. It is no concern
of ours that other regulatory devices might be more appropriate,
or that less extensive measures might suffice. Such matters are
the province of the legislature and the Commission.
Id. at 185-86.
21. For instance, Wyoming's Oil Conservation Law enacted in 1951 reads as
follows:
It is not the intent or purpose of this law to require the pro-ration
or distribution of the production of oil and gas among the fields
of Wyoming on the basis of market demand. This act shall never
be construed to require, permit or authorize the commission, the
supervisor, or any court to make, enter, or enforce any order, rule,
regulation or judgment requiring restriction of production of any
pool or of any well to an amount less than the well or pool can
produce in accordance with sound engineering practice.
WYO. STAT. § 30-229 (1957).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/3
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A federal measure instituted under N.R.A. and serving
to enhance the enforcement of state production control was
the provision for "forecasts of demand." Initially a Petroleum Administration Board, partially composed of representatives of the industry, advised the Secretary of Interior
of demand forecasts. Later the Bureau of Mines, itself within
the Department of Interior, began to make these forecasts.
This picture is continued to this day.2 Neither the monthly
nor annual forecasts of the Bureau of Mines possess authority2" binding on state production-control agencies, but they
are helpful and are given considerable weight by state authorities in setting their production quotas.
3. The Critics
Economists, legal scholars and political commentators
have been outspoken critics of the present system of production control under state "conservation statutes." Eugene
Rostow, former Dean of the Yale Law School, claims that the
Bureau of Mines forecasts of demand [and the state
quotas which follow from it] depend on a concealed
premise of price stability. Their effect is to state
how much or how little crude oil need be produced
to permit prices to remain fixed.24
Rostow asserts that such demand estimates work like the
statistical service condemned in the Sugar Institute,25 Maple
Flooring" and American Column & Lumber27 anti-trust cases.
Rostow proposes a total "reorganization" of the oil industry
22. In addition, the Bureau of Mines was directed by the Presidential Proclamation of March 12, 1959, to provide the Oil Import Administration with
periodic forecasts of domestic demand and production to assist the Administration in establishing import quotas. 24 Fed. Reg. 1781.
23. Indeed, such critical writers as Rostow (see note 20 supra) claim that
"the Bureau of Mines estimates, the keystone of the entire plan, are without
support in substantive legislation. No statute prescribes standards or
policies for guiding the agency in its determinations of permissible supply."
RoSTOW, op. cit. supra note 20, at 29.

24. ROSTOW, op. cit. supra note 20, at 27. Compare this charge to the language
of the Interstate Oil Compact, Article V:
It is not the purpose of this compact to authorize the states
joining herein to limit the production of oil or gas for the purpose
of stabilizing or fixing the price thereof, or create or perpetuate
a monopoly, or to promote regimentation, but is limited to the
purpose of conserving oil and gas and preventing the avoidable
waste thereof within reasonable limitations.
25. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
26. Maple Flooring Mfgs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
27. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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by Sherman Act prosecutions aimed at dissolving oil "monopolies" on both horizontal and vertical planes.28
Writing in 1959, economists Melvin de Chazeau and
Alfred Kahn are generally of the same view.29 They note
that the Texas Railroad Commission in arriving at its production quotas anticipates imports and oil produced in states
without production controls. "By thus allowing for estimated
supplies beyond its jurisdiction, Texas, in effect, brings the
total available supply, including imports, within the principle
of prorationing to market demand.""0
On the other hand, Ralph Cassady concludes from his
lengthy study of price making and price behavior in the
petroleum industry that price competition, while not "perfect," is sufficiently keen at all levels of the industry.31 In
this he follows Professor Bain, who wrote between 1944 and
1947.2 Zimmerman 3 takes a middle position and advocates

much less drastic reforms in the area of conservation regulation than is proposed by de Chazeau and Kahn 4 or by Rostow.
Before it can formulate any policy for the development
of oil shale, Congress should examine the conflicting points
of view of these various writers and make its own finding of
how best to regulate oil production in this country. Future
supply and demand estimates for oil will be one set of crucial
questions facing Congress. Further, it must receive some
estimates of the quantities of shale oil which could be phased
harmoniously into the future domestic supply stream. With
these figures before it, Congress must ask: "What effect,
if any, should the present system of production control have
upon the production of shale oil?" The question might be
asked more explicitly: "Should the Texas Railroad Commission be permitted to retain its position of power with respect
to production control once oil shale is introduced into the
28. RosTOw, op. cit. supra note 20, at 123.
29. DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY (1959).

30. Id. at 123.
31.

CASSADY,

PRICE MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

334 (1954).
32.

33.

BAIN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC COAST PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1944-47).
ZIMMERMAN, CONSERVATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM (1957).

34. They advocate federal legislation requiring mandatory utilization. DE CHA"upra
note 29.
ZEAU & KAHN, Op. cit.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/3
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domestic market?" Perhaps Congress will determine that
the present system of production control should remain in
effect and that the Texas Railroad Commission should be
permitted to count shale oil simply as another source of
supply-like imports-in arriving at its demand estimates. Perhaps Congress will decide that the development
of oil shale, and other factors, now necessitate some of the
reforms advocated by the critics of the present system and
that the time has come for federal, rather than state, control
of domestic oil production.
All these are questions which only Congress can properly answer.
B. The Federal Government as Landowner
1. Land Laws in Chronology
In discussing the exercise of the government's powers
in its capacity as landowner, it will be most convenient to
present those land laws relevant to oil shale in a chronological order.
1780. The Continental Congress of 1780 created the
"public domain" by a resolution which read that:
The unappropriated lands that may be ceded or
relinquished to the United States, by any particular
states ... shall be disposed of for the common bene-

fit of the United States, and be settled and formed
into distinct republican states, which shall become
members of the federal union, and shall have the
same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other states . .

..

One of the many compromises made by the confederating
states was their agreement to relinquish their western territorial claims to the new United States. Thus they created
the public domain and provided the federal regime with a
source of revenue to pay for the Revolutionary War. Later,
the territorial boundaries of the United States were to be
completed by additions to the public domain through purchase, treaty and conquest.
35. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 915 (Ford & Hunt ed. 1904-37).
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1788. Article IV,Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution
vests Congress with the power "to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations relating to the Territory or
other Property of the United States."
Any rights, therefore, to oil or mineral deposits located
within property owned or controlled by the federal government may be acquired only pursuant to legislation enacted
by Congress.
1872. The Mining Act of 18726 codified pre-existing local
mining customs and allowed an outright federal grant of title
to mineral-bearing lands by fee simple patent.
1897. In 1897 "an Act to authorize the entry and patenting of lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils
under the placer mining laws of the United States" 7 made
it clear that petroleum was a locatable mineral, and until
1910 thousands of acres in California, Wyoming and other
western states were patented as a result of petroleum discoveries. However, the general mining laws were ill suited
to the proper development of the oil industry and contributed
to its instability in the early stages. Under these laws the
common law rule of capture, coupled with the legislative
demand for discovery, acted as a stimulant to excessive and
wasteful production of petroleum.
1910. Conservation sentiment was on the upsurge during
President Taft's administration, and in 1909 most of the
remaining public domain was withdrawn by Executive Order
from petroleum entries under the mining laws. These withdrawal orders were confirmed by the Pickett Act of 1910.8
1920. During the decade that followed President Taft's
withdrawal orders conservationists struggled with those representing the "free-miner" tradition in an effort to develop
a federal petroleum land policy. The result was the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920" which represented compromises from
both sides. The 1920 Act represented a radical policy shift
from the outright granting of title to federal lands and min36.
37.
38.
39.

REV. STAT. §
29 Stat. 526
36 Stat. 847
41 Stat. 437

2319 (1875), 30 U.S.C.
(1897), 30 U.S.C. § 101
(1910), 43 U.S.C. § 141
(1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181

§ 21 (1964).
(1964).
(1964).
(1964).
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erals by fee simple patent to a policy which allowed the
development of federal lands under a lessor-lessee relationship. Nevertheless, in retrospect the Mineral Leasing Act
does show a legislative intent to allow for the development
of petroleum by private industry. The Act likens the federal
government to any other private owner of minerals who grants
an oil and gas lease on his lands, and it contemplates that
leasing and development will be by private, rather than public,
hands.
A paradox exists, however, for despite the large acreage
of the public domain available for leasing under the Mineral
Leasing Act, petroleum production from these lands has
rarely exceeded 5 per cent of the total production of the
United States. Federal land and mining law has never,
therefore, been a critical factor in the major problems of
conservation and marketing, discussed earlier, confronting
the petroleum industry in the past.
Northcutt Ely comments:
Most of the important discoveries of hard minerals
have been made on land belonging to the Federal
Government . . . not so as to oil and gas. By a
queer combination of historical and geographical
accidents, the major 'discoveries of petroleum and
natural gas have been on lands that were never
federally owned [in Texas] or on lands that had
passed from federal to private ownership, without
a reservation of minerals, prior to discovery.4"
But the paradox has come full circle, for while lands
covered by the Mineral Leasing Act produce only a minimal
amount of petroleum today, the oil shale deposits of the Green
River Formation in Colorado, Wyoming and Utah, lie almost
wholly 4 ' under federal lands and are explicitly subject to
Section 21 of the original Mineral Leasing Act.2 Thus the
federal government in its capacity as "landowner" will
determine the future fate of oil shale.
1930-1966. On April 15, 1930, President Hoover issued
Executive Order 5327, which withdrew designated lands con40.

ELY, MINERAL TITLES AND TENURE, ECONOMICS OF THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES

108 (1959).
41. See note 3 supra.
42. 41 Stat. 445 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
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taining deposits of oil shale from further leasing under the
Mineral Leasing Act and "temporarily" reserved these lands
for the purpose of "investigation, examination, and classification."' Whatever purpose President Hoover may have
had in mind when issuing the order in 1930 is not now clear.
But the fact remains that this "temporary" withdrawal order
remains still in effect today, having prohibited for over 35
years the leasing of federal lands containing over 80 per
cent of the known oil shale reserves in this country.
2. Recent Developments in Petroleum Leasing Policy
While leasing of federal oil shale lands has been foreclosed by Executive Order 5327, recent developments in petroleum-leasing policies in other areas are worthy of note. Some
may suggest possible examples to be followed for oil-shale
leasing in the future.
Multiple Use Act. In 1954 Public Law 585, The Multiple
Use Act," provided for multiple mineral development of
public lands. The Act resolved the head-on clash which had
arisen between uranium and petroleum interests by allowing
each to prospect and secure rights for their respective minerals on the same lands. Representative Aspinall (D-Colo.)
said that the bill in committee was "one of the finest examples
of what can be 'done when people with different approaches
to a very complex problem can sit down and present a united
front to the Congress of the United States.'"'"
Alaskan Waters. In the Act of July 3, 1958,48 Congress
authorized leasing of oil and gas lands beneath non-tidal
navigable waters in Alaska. The Secretary of Interior was
directed to lease the lands pursuant to the provisions of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which apply to leasing on nonsubmerged federal lands in Alaska.
Submerged Lands Act and Outer ContinentalShelf Lands
Act. In 1953 Congress settled a long-standing dispute between the states and the federal government over the owner43. 43 C.F.R. 405 (1930).
44. 68 Stat. 708 (1954), 80 U.S.C. § 521 (1964).
45. Hearings on H.R. 8892 and H.R. 8896 before the Subcommittee on Mines
and Mining of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
46. 72 Stat. 322 (1958), 48 U.S.C. 456 (1964). Section omitted when Alaska
became a state.
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ship of offshore oil deposits. The Submerged Lands Act of
May 22, 1953," deeded ownership to the states of lands up
to three miles from the shore." Beyond the state limits lands
were 'designated as "outer continental shelf," subject to
federal jurisdiction and control under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act."
That Act removed these lands from the provisions of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, and Section 6 of the new Act
established procedures for leasing of compact areas, not
exceeding 5,760 acres each, by competitive bidding on the
basis of a cash bonus with a royalty fixed at not less than
12 per cent.
C. The Government in the Exercise of the National Defense
and Foreign Commerce Powers: Oil Import Controls and
Foreign Trade Agreements
With the new discoveries of the exceedingly rich oil
reserves in South America, principally in Venezuela, and in
the Middle East, major American oil companies were the
first to offer the capital and technological know-how necessary for their development. Development has usually been
accomplished through concessions granted by the foreign
countries to the private companies. Under these concessions
approximately 50 per cent of the oil revenues are turned
over to the foreign governments, and the developing companies must find their profits in what remains. Production
in these oil-rich areas has been expanded greatly in the postWorld War II period and much of the foreign oil has found
its way into American markets."0
Congress has delegated to the Executive Branch the task
of administering an oil import control program. At the
present time the State Department, the Office of Emergency
47. 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
48. In a recent ruling the Supreme Court granted a Justice Department request
to release $203 million of funds which had been impounded as a result of
the dispute between the Federal Government and Louisiana over offshore
oil rights.
The U.S. will receive about $170 million and Louisiana $35 million of
money collected from royalties, leases and bonuses in the disputed area.
The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1965, p. 26.
49. 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
50.

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, UNITED STATES OIL IMPORTS:
A CASE STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1958).
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Planning, the Department of Interior, the Defense Department and, to an increasingly important degree, the Justice
Department are all instrumental in arriving at a "consensus"
concerning oil import policy within the Executive Branch.5 1
In 1949 domestic producers began appealing to the State
Department for a restriction of imports. The State Department in rejecting these appeals adhered to the general policy
against import quotas announced in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
The Korean War temporarily alleviated the pressures
of import competition. Then in July, 1954 President Eisenhower established the Cabinet Committee on Energy Supplies
and Resources Policy. This Committee concluded that our
national security could best be protected if imports were
kept in balance with the domestic production of crude oil
in the proportionate ratios which existed in 1954. The Committee recommended a program of "voluntary restrictions of
imports" to be practiced by the industry itself.
During the next few years and throughout the Suez
crisis 5 the voluntary program worked with less and less effectiveness, until 1959, when President Eisenhower created by
proclamation the Mandatory Oil Import Control Program. 4
Under this program, which remains in effect today, imports
of crude oil, unfinished oils and finished products (except
residual fuel oil to be used as fuel) entering Districts I-IV
(including all of the United States east of the Rockies) are
not to exceed 9 per cent of the total demand in those districts.
In District V (which includes the West Coast) imports are
51. As a Texas Senator, President Johnson was an outspoken exponent of
import limitations by quotas, but since taking office, he has said he was
leaving revisions of oil import policy to Secretary of Interior Udall. Wall
Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1965, p. 7.
52. Signed at the Geneva Conference of 1947 between the U.S. and 22 other
nations.
53. During the Iranian and Suez crises major American companies producing
in the Middle East were asked by the U.S. government to meet together
for the purpose of ascertaining how best to overcome the effects of the
crisis on supply and demand. They were guaranteed immunity from any
antitrust litigation. Their voluntary agreements remain on file and will
be put into effect upon the consent of the U.S. Attorney General in the
event of any such future international petroleum supply crises. See Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History, ABA SECT. M & NRL (Sullivan ed.
1958).

54. Pres. Proc. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959), as amended by Pres. Proc. No.
3290, 24 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1959) which exempted from import restrictions
crude oil imported by overland means from Canada or Mexico.
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limited to an amount which, together with domestic production and supply, will approximate total demand in the district. Puerto Rico was given a quota whereby imports were
not to exceed those of calendar year 1957. The Oil Import
Administration, Department of Interior, is charged with the
responsibility of maintaining the proper ratio of imports
to 'demand. In 1964," 5 the ratio stood at 9.6 per cent, an
increase of .6 per cent over 1959. The O.I.A. also supervises
the allocation of import quotas to individual oil and petrochemical refiners.
At the present time the State Department isattempting
to follow generally an open-door policy with respect to foreign trade. That Department, operating under the mandates
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA)," is committed
to the belief "that it is in our national interest to maximize
foreign trade." 5 7 Nevertheless, the requirements of national
security are recognized as one justifiable exception to this
otherwise open-door policy.
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act sets out the
rules governing the use of this exception and represents the
legal basis for the present oil import control program. Under
that section the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning
is authorized to investigate and promptly advise the President
of any importations threatening the national security. The
President is then directed by the section to take such steps
as are necessary to remove the threat. Under subsection (c)" s
55. Monthly Petroleum Statement, Mineral Industry Surveys, Dept. of Interior,
March 8, 1965, Table 22.
56. Act of Oct. 11, 1962, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C.).
57. Letter from Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations, Dept. of State, to Gordon Allott, U.S. Senate, Aug. 9, 1965.
58. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, supra note 56, § 232.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the Director and the President
shall, in the light of the requirements of national security and without
excluding other relevant factors, give consideration to domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, existing
and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products, raw
materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national
defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies
and services including the investment, exploration, and development
necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms
of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect
such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national
security requirements. In the administration of this section, the Director
and the President shall further recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the nation to our national security, and shall take
into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic
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of Section 232 the Director and President are told in broad
language to "recognize the close relation of the economic
welfare of the Nation to our national security." In addition,
the subsection admonishes recognition of the effect of imports on "the requirements of growth of such industries
[critical to defense] and such supplies and services including
the investment, exploration, and development necessary to
assure such growth. ... "
As recently as August, 1965 the Department of State"0
maintained that any further restriction of oil imports would
not be necessary for national security and would not be in
the national interest. In support of its position it notes, for
instance, that Venezuela draws nearly 60 per cent of its
government income directly from its petroleum industry, and
that petroleum constitutes about 90 per cent of all Venezuelan
exports. Therefore, "increasing prosperity for the Venezuelan petroleum industry is essential if the country is to
remain an effective democracy and a keystone in our relations with Latin America.""0
There has been a marked increase in oil imports allowed
within the last year. Import quotas on residual fuel oil
were raised at eastern ports for 1966 by Secretary Udall,
despite strong objections from coal and domestic oil producers and a number of eastern railroads and utility companies. 1 Secretary Udall has indicated further that he favors
the complete elimination of any import restrictions on residual
fuel oil.6" In order to accomplish unlimited imports Secretary
Udall must, and apparently will, appeal to the Office of
Emergency Planning for a ruling that such a move would
not endanger national security. As will be seen in Part Two,
United States programs regulating foreign oil imports and

59.
60.
61.
62.

welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or
investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement
of any domestic products by excessive imports shall be considered,
without excluding other factors, in determining whether such weakening
of our internal economy may impair the nation's security.
76 Stat. 877 (1962), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (1964).
MacArthur Letter, supra note 57.
Letter from Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations, Dept. of State, to Gordon Allott, U.S. Senate, June 22, 1965.
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 23, 1965, p. 2.
Ibid.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/3

18

Dominick: Oil Shale - The Need for a National Policy

1967

NATIONAL OIL SHALE PoLCY

our national defense requirements must be taken into account
in arriving at any policy for the development of oil shale.
PART TWO
GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE

DEVELOPMENT OF OIL SHALE

Today there is no federal policy providing for the
development of oil shale. Undersecretary of the Interior
John A. Carver, Jr., in testifying before the Senate Interior
Committee in May, 1965 said, "This reserve is so big and so
valuable that.., when one hears words like Teapot Dome...
it tends to freeze any kind of action, either congressional
or administrative. "63
And yet the formulation of an appropriate national policy
is essential for the future development of oil shale. In an
effort to discover why no such policy has ever been formed,
this paper will first give an outline of the current situation.
Next to be discussed will be the many problems which Congress must consider if, and when, it decides to establish
comprehensive leasing procedures for the future commercial
development of federal oil shale lands.
The problem of contested claims for unpatented lands
lies outside the scope of this paper." As was indicated
earlier, 5 the amount of land involved in these mining claim
disputes is minimal compared to the oil shale lands and
deposits which await the formulation of a federal leasing
policy. Futhermore, the formulation of such a policy should
not be precluded by the presence of these contested claims.
Any policy covering the lease of federal lands would still
leave resolution 8 of remaining conflicts over contested lands
to appropriate proceedings between the respective claimants.
Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 61.
See note 5 supra.
See note 3 eupra.
Senator Allott (R. Colo.) has introduced legislation in the past two Congresses addressed to the problem. S. 1009, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
This bill is intended to amend the "savings" clause, Section 37, of the
Mineral Leasing Act by reasserting the present validity of claims to oil
shale lands which were valid but unpatented at the date of passage of the
Mineral Leasing Act. The bill, if passed, would effectively revoke all
administrative and legal actions taken by the Secretary of Interior in
declaring these unpatented claims invalid. The bill has died in the Senate
Interior Committee both times and that committee has apparently received
no Department Report concerning it from the Secretary of Interior.
See also, CONG. REC. 1962 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1965).
67. Ely, upra note 11, at 303.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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A. The Present Situation
1. Research
There is abundant material covering the economic,"
technologic"9 and geologic"° (principally in Colorado) aspects
of oil shale.
The Bureau of Mines has been conducting oil shale
research for the past half-century. A portion of
this research took place at the Anvil Points demonstration and experimental plant near Rifle, Colorado. Work is presently underway there under a
lease agreement between the U.S. Government and
the Colorado School of Mines Research Foundation
operating in conjunction with Socony-Mobil, Humble, Shell, Sinclair, Texaco, Marathon, Continental,
Standard of Ohio, Pan American, and The Oil Shale
Corporation. The Union Oil Company of California
and the Denver Research Institute continue to
experiment with retorting methods. And finally
the experimental activities of the Bureau of Mines
Petroleum Research Center in Laramie, Wyoming,
have recently been expanded.'
As will be seen immediately below, private enterprise
now has enough information with which to begin commercial
production of shale oil. So it cannot be claimed that a lack
of scientific 'data prevents the formulation of an oil shale
policy. Technological advances will always be forthcoming,
and the state of the art can always be improved, but there
is enough evidence available now to make any of the determinations necessary for the formulation of a leasing policy. 2
68. HANNA, OIL SHALE, (Reprinted by Denver Research Institute, 1964).
The Oil Shale Corporation, Oil Shale Development on Federal Lands,
Supplemental Written Statement to Oil Shale Advisory Board, Nov. 30,
1964 [hereinafter referred to as "TOSCO"].
69. Prien, Current Status of U.S. Oil Shale Technology, (Reprinted by Denver
Research Institute, 1964).
Schramm & Lankford, Oil Shale, DEP'T. INTERIOR, reprint from BUR.
MINES BULL. 630 (1965).

Thorne, Stanfield, Dinneen & Murphy, Oil Shale Technology: A Review,
70.

DEP'T. INTERIOR, BUR. MINES IC 8216 (1964).
DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BUREAU OF MINES PUBLICATION ON
OIL SHALE AND SHALE OIL (1964).

71. Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 4, 8-9.
72. NETSCHERT, THE FUTURE SUPPLY OF OIL AND GAS (1958). In addition, see
the extensive tables and statistics on trends in energy consumption and
U.S. and world resources of energy in fossil and nuclear fuels collected
by the Department of Interior.

DEP'T. INTERIOR SYNPOSIS,

op. cit. sup'ra

note 3, at 2-20.
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Those who now cry for "more research" must only be trying
to stall.
2. Private Industry
It is axiomatic that the economic feasibility of any capitalist venture will be best evaluated by those whose capital
is at stake. The Oil Shale Corporation (familiarly known
as TOSCO) was founded in 1955. "Its principal purpose
was then the development of a commercially feasible, aboveground retorting system for the economical recovery of oil
and other products from the oil shales of the Western United
States. ""
At the present time TOSCO is engaged in such a joint
venture with Standard Oil of Ohio and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
Ore Co., operating together under the name of Colony Development Co. In November, 1964, TOSCO had already expended
or committed $15 million, and it plans to spend in addition
approximately $30 million" for its participation in the project.
As part of their project the joint-venturers have built
a plant costing approximately $100 million in northern Colorado. This plant will process commercial quantities of oil
from shale being mined from non-federal lands. TOSCO expects to achieve production from this plant in 1967 with initial
capacity set at 50,000 barrels of crude oil per day. 5 It
estimates further that costs per barrel at that rate will
be between $1.00 and $1.30, depending upon the inclusion of
hydrogenation.7 6 By TOSCO's estimates, these costs make
shale oil competitive with comparable crude oils presently
being laid down in West Coast markets."
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

TOSCO, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1.
Ibid.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 7.
The Department of Interior gave the following cost figures:
One estimate recently made is that high-gravity shale oil
from a 25,000 barrel-per-day plant could be delivered to Los
Angeles for $2 a barrel, and if production were quintupled, the
cost would drop to $1.76. Oil of comparable quality is now selling
in Los Angeles for $2.85 a barrel, but comparisons have to be
made with prices assumed if controls [Presumably, tax depletion
allowances and oil import quota "input allowances" (ef. TOSCO,
op. cit. supra note 68, at 15, 16 and Appendix F).] were relaxed
[which has not occurred to date.]
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Such a commercial commitment leaves little room for
argument. It is made more important by the fact that the
Colony Development venture plans to produce commercial
quantities of shale oil from relatively poor shale deposits
lying wholly within privately owned or patented lands. Thus
it is crystal clear that representatives of private enterprise
believe that oil can, and will, be competitively produced from
oil shale. Industry demonstrates itself ready to proceed without further delay.
3. The Courts
In Alabama v. Texas7" the Supreme Court dismissed
suits challenging the rights of states to take lands under
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953"s on the ground that Congress had unlimited plenary power under the Constitution
to dispose of the public domain in any way it saw fit. Thus
the courts may be dismissed as presenting any obstacle to
the establishment of a federal leasing policy.
4. The States
In 1957 the Assembly of the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission, representing thirty oil-producing states, unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the opening of federal
oil shale lands."0
Further, the states of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah,
through their state executives and their congressional delegations, have consistently sought development of their oil shale
resources. Colorado has been particularly active in seeking
early development, and in 1964 Governor Love stated: "We
look to oil shale as another great industry in our State which
can and will be developed in such a manner as to be compatible with the preservation of our scenic splendor and wildlife. ' ,81

78.
79.
80.
81.

On the other hand, the Oil Shale Advisory Board reported to the Secretary
of Interior in February, 1965, its opinion that "it appears that at best
oil shale would be only marginally competitive with the petroleum industry
today." INTERIM REPORT OF OIL SHALE ADVISORY BOARD TO THE SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR (Feb., 1965) (transmitted by letter of Chairman Joseph
L. Fisher, Feb. 15, 1965).
347 U.S. 272 (1954).
67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
Resolution No. 8, Meeting of June 12, 1957, Yellowstone National Park.
Statement of Governor John A. Love to the National Oil Shale Advisory
Board, Dec. 1, 1964.
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Thus it seems that no state seeks to obstruct the development of oil shale.
5. The Federal Executive
It was seen earlier that authority to administer regulations covering the leasing of federal oil shale lands has
been delegated to the Secretary of Interior. Thus, while the
Secretary could institute and administer a program for the
leasing of federal laids, no secretary has ever attempted to
do so2 Secretary of Interior Udall has been the most elusive

of all public figures on the subject of oil shale and has
only said he wishes to prevent another oil scandal in this
country.8
Mr. James H. Smith calls such references to old scandals "pure demagoguery" and says, "If the government is
unable today to arrange contracts between itself and private
enterprise dealing with public property without the risk of
repeating Teapot Dome, then we do not have a competent
government. " 4
In 1963, apparently in partial response to such criticisms, Secretary Udall published an order cancelling the
existing leasing regulations and calling for public comment
as to what should go into new ones. 5 Later, the Secretary
created a "blue-ribbon panel" called the Oil Shale Advisory
Board and appointed Joseph L. Fisher, chairman, Orlo E.
Childs, Benjamin V. Cohen, John Kenneth Galbraith, H.
Byron Mock and Milo Perkins.
At the invitation of the Secretary of Interior and the
Oil Shale Advisory Board, Governor Love of Colorado recommended immediate competitive leasing of oil shale lands under
82.

President John F. Kennedy viewed administration of the public domains
thus:
My predecessors have been acutely aware of the dilemmas
facing the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior as principal
administrators of the original public domain. Whenever they have
been faced with a reasonable alternative of continued public
ownership and management, or disposition, they have generally
elected the former.
83. HANNA, op. cit. supra note 68, at 10.
84. The Denver Post, supra note 11.
85. 28 Fed. Reg. 11796 (1963), revoking 43 C.F.R. pt. 197 (1963) (Oil Shale
Leases).
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the old provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act.8" It was recommended that such leasing be done in three phases with a
5 per cent royalty at the outset. Very similar recommendations were made to the Oil Shale Advisory Board by The
Oil Shale Corporation in 1964.8" The Oil Shale Advisory
Board issued an "interim" report"8 to the Secretary in February, 1965, but unfortunately no consensus was reached on
major leasing policy questions and the report has been likened
to "six dissents saying nothing." No further report from
the Advisory Board has yet appeared on the horizon, and
Secretary Udall now seems little disposed to take any affirmative action.
Undersecretary of Interior John Carver, Jr., has been
perhaps most candid and pointed of all when he recently said:
The Secretary has not yet determined what recommendation should be made to Congress, if any, for
the resolution of any policy questions prior to the
lifting of the withdrawal order ....
Legally, as I have already said, I think he has the
power to lift the order, promulgate regulations,
and begin to issue leases ....
But I also think that no Secretary, beginning with
Hubert Work, right down to the present one, can
take any more than tiny and tentative steps which
have the effect of relinquishing title to this resource
without running great risks of misinterpretation
...
. It is, in my personal and unofficial view, a
question requiring congressional resolution. 9
6. Congress
Thus it is that we are led by a process of elimination
to the one body of the federal government which can, and
should, come to grips with the oil shale policy problem.
Senator Bennett of Utah addresses himself to the problem
with a statement entitled "Do Something." 9 A response
to Senator Bennett is that it is now up to Congress "to do
86. Letter from John A. Love, Governor of Colorado, to Stewart L. Udall,
Secretary of Interior, March 27, 1964.
87. TOSCO, op. cit. supra note 68, at 17.
88.

INTERIM REPORT OF THE OIL SHALE ADVISORY BOARD, op. cit. supra note 77.

89. Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 38-39.
90. Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 6.
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the doing" and to reassume here a portion of the initiative
which some feel it has lost by default to the Executive
Branch of our Government.
In May, 1965 the first "informational" hearings on oil
shale were held by the Senate Interior Conmittee.91 Senator
Jackson, Chairman of the Committee, opened the hearing
with these words:
All too often in dealing with problems affecting
our natural resources, both economic and aesthetic,
this committee is faced with a condition, not a
theory. Conditions often demand ad hoc solutions
to immediate limited problems. But ... such is not

the case here today. We hope to have basic facts and
issues presented, and then to be able to deliberate
upon broad overall policy questions involved in the
wisest and best course of action to take with respect
to this great natural resource .... 9

In addition to committee action and congressional hearings, it may be that the oil shale policy problem will be
taken up by the recently established Public Land Law Review
Commission." The Commission, which is to make its report
by June 30, 1968, is not explicitly directed to study oil shale,
but such a study is clearly not outside the Commission's
present authority."
B. Formulation of a Leasing Policy:
Immediate Considerations
If Congress is to formulate a leasing policy for the
early development of oil shale, it must deal with a number
of specific, immediate considerations. Many of them have
already been outlined by members of the Oil Shale Advisory
Board. 5 None present insurmountable problems. Straightforward alternatives are available from which Congress can
make its necessary policy choices with relative ease.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3.
Id. at 2.
78 Stat. 982 (1964), 43 U.S.C. § 1391 (1965).
S. REP. No. 1444, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1964).
Mock, supra note 12, at 59-60. See there "Issues to be considered by the
Oil Shale Advisory Board."
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1. Conservation
Two distinct conservation problems present themselves
when considering oil shale development. First, there is
concern for other regional resources in the oil shale area.
Second is the concern for maximum utilization of the oil
shale resource itself.
As was noted earlier, the State of Colorado is actively
aware of the need to protect all of its many resources. Thus
Governor Love has said:
Conservation problems, including the disposal of
spent shale and the prevention of possible atmospheric and water pollution are under active study
by agencies in our State, as are community problems relating to schools, highways, etc. We see no
insoluble problems.9
The Oil Shale Corporation has also recognized the need
for industry to assume its share of the conservation burden
and to insure adequate protection of air, water, surface lands,
wildlife, etc."'
In addition, TOSCO recommended to the Secretary of
Interior far-thinking measures to insure proper utilization
of the oil shale itself. Among these was a plan for allowing
lower royalties as an incentive for the extraction of marginal
and low-grade shales."
One problem to be considered is the disposal of the
vast amounts of waste shale left over from the retorting
process. This problem sounds less imposing when one hears
from the Bureau of Mines that vegetation will begin to grow
on the spent shale deposits after about three years of weathering."
Nevertheless, there are some who wish to prevent completely any commercial activity on the public domain. These
so-called "protectionists" thus oppose the development of
oil shale at any time or for any reason. But if the real
problems of conservation are met and solved in a forthright
96. Statement of Governor John A. Love to the National Oil Shale Advisory
Board, Dec. 1, 1964.
97. TOSCO, op. cit. upra note 68, at 17.
98. Id. at 20.
99. HANNA, Op. cit. supra note 68, at 6.
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manner and if Congress finds that oil shale development is
in the national interest, then any continued objections by
these protectionists will not be justified.
2. Water
It has long been recognized that water will be crucial
in the commercial development of oil shale, and recently major
oil companies have been buying up water rights adjacent to
oil shale.' 0
The future of the waters of Colorado, Wyoming and
Utah is inextricably tied up with the Colorado River Storage
Project Act.' and with current legislation and interstate
agreements affecting the allocation of waters in the Upper
and Lower Colorado River Basins. It is clearly to the advantage of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah to appropriate their
unused shares in Upper Colorado River waters as soon as
possible." 2 Utilization in the oil shale industry is ideally
suited for such appropriation."'
3. Acreage Limitations
The question of acreage limitations is one of the most
vexing problems confronted when one tries to prescribe fair
leasing terms. Irregularity in grade and in thickness of the
shale beds makes the amount of oil recoverable from under
different surface acreage vary greatly. For instance, a 5,120acre plot (the maximum allowed under the existing Mineral
Leasing Act) in the richest parts of the shale formation would
contain 18 billion barrels, an amount equal to nearly 60 per
cent of the Nation's proved reserves of petroleum.0 4
Leasing by competitive bid is one answer to this problem.
The Government could specify a fixed dollar amount to be
100. See the recent excellent article: Delaney, Water for Oil Shale Development,
43 DENvER L.J. 75 (1966).
101. 70 Stat. 105 (1956), 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1964).
102. Legislation for the establishment of a national wild rivers system was
proposed in the last session of Congress. S. 1446, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). One of the crucial implications of the bill is that future water
appropriations may be foreclosed on any river to be included within the
wild river system. The Green River of Wyoming is scheduled for possible
inclusion in the system. This fact could foreseeably do great damage to
the future development of oil shale in Wyoming.
103. In November, 1965, the Interior Department agreed to sell to Colony
Development Co. up to 7,200 acre-feet of water annually at a sliding
charge from $8.50 to $10.40 an acre foot. The contract will run for a
term of 40 years. Wyoming State Tribune, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 3.
104. Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 35.
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paid by the bidders and each bidder would then calculate
the least number of acres he would be willing to receive for
that cost. The winner would be the company bidding the
lowest number of acres. Undersecretary of Interior Carver
said, "I see no reason why a competitive situation could not
be cranked adequately into a leasing system."'' 5
Congress will not be without helpful precedents in its
search for fair leasing procedures. In Part One of this paper
other recent developments in domestic petroleum leasing
policy were traced. Of particular note is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 6 which created procedures outside
of the Mineral Leasing Act for competitive leasing of offshore oil reserves.
Further, it may now behoove the United States to look
to Canada as a source for leasing precedents. Historically,
Canada has given greater emphasis to hard-rock mining laws
in deriving leasing principles for the development of its
petroleum resources."' The United States might well follow
that example with respect to its oil shale. In 1963, for
instance, production was begun in the Athabascan Tar Sands.
Dominion control of Canadian oil lands had been relinquished
to the provinces in 1930 ;10o therefore, it is Alberta that has

been responsible for the formulation of a policy for the
development of its tar sands. In 1963 Alberta issued the
first production permit for 31,500 barrels per day to Great
Canadian Oil and Sand Ltd.1"9 The Alberta government in
a statement of policy dated October 19, 1962, affirms that
production from the oil sands will be authorized at levels
so as not to interfere unduly with present or foreseeable
markets for conventionally produced Alberta crude oil.
4. Revenues

Along with acreage limitations, the question of revenues
is basic to any leasing policy. Further, it is a question which
105. Id. at 62.
106. Cf. note 49 supra.
107. Thompson, Basic ContrastsBetween Petroleum Land Policies of Canada and
the United States, 36 U. COLO. L. REY. 187 (1964).
108. Id. at 211.
109. New York Times, April 8, 1963, p. 153.
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only Congress is authorized to settle. Separate aspects of
this basic problem include royalties, taxation and depletion
allowances, and the distribution of government income.
Under the existing Mineral Leasing Act, 37.5 per cent
of the revenue from oil shale leases would be allocated to
the state in which the lands are located, 52.5 per cent would
go to the Reclamation Fund, and 10 percent would go to
general receipts.110 In formulating an oil shale policy, Congress may change this distribution as it sees fit.
Congress also must make an equitable determination
with respect to royalties. TOSCO and Governor Love of
Colorado have recommended a royalty of 5 per cent.'
As
was seen, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act prescribes
a minimum royalty of 121/2 per cent for offshore leases." 2
The issue of depletion allowances on oil revenues is
one of foremost importance to the developing oil shale industry. At the present time the Internal Revenue Service has
ruled"' that an allowance of 15 per cent, as specified by
statute," 4 will be given on shales after mining. Representative
Aspinall (D-Colo.) is seeking to clarify this ruling by specifying that the allowance is to come after retorting instead
of after mining." 5 In addition, crude oil producers receive
a depletion allowance of 271/ per cent, and the developers of
oil shale seek to have themselves included in this greater
allowance category." '
5. New Entries
It was pointed out earlier" 7 that leaders in the oil shale
industry must be careful lest they run afoul of anti-trust
laws prohibiting unfair competition practices which would
work to the disadvantage of new entrants into the field.
Apart from anti-trust considerations, a concern has also
been expressed that the high capital requirements for entry
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

THE OIL SHALE ADVISORY BOARD, op. cit. supra note 77, at 9.
See p. 84 supra.
See p. 75 supra.
Unpublished.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
H.R. 10896, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
TOSCO, op. cit. supra note 68, at 30-32.
See p. 67 aupra.
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into the oil shale industry will prevent small companies
from successfully competing with large, established companies. This is a problem which may exist during the development of any new industry, but it is clear that further
delay by the government in opening the industry to development will only serve to entrench more firmly those major
companies with private landholdings and experimental sites.
The Atomic Energy Acts of 194611" and 195411 dealt
with this same problem by placing in the public domain
certain patent rights acquired by companies who had established themselves in the industry 'during its early, governmentally controlled stages. The 1954 Act also requires licensees to make a full disclosure of any unpatented technology
possessed by them at the time their license is granted. Congress might use similar procedures in order to insure fair
treatment for all participants in oil shale development.
6. Speculation
The Department of Interior has often expressed its
2
brood menacingly over
fear that "speculative tendancies""'
prospective oil shale development. But it should be pointed
out that the "do-nothing" attitude of that Department has
probably contributed more than any other single factor to
speculation in oil shale land and adjacent water rights.
Byron Mock, a member of the Oil Shale Advisory Board,
recently said:
At least to me, the taint of Teapot Dome and its
application to the oil shale reserves of the Federal
Government will best be laid to rest by opening all
or part of the Federal oil shale lands to competitive
leasing with performance requirements written in
that eliminate those who cannot or will not develop
the reserve. This does not mean that all should be
opened at once but in my opinion some should be.
To some the withholding of the federal oil shale
reserves from development may be construed to be
as great a granting of favors to those who wish to
restrict competition in that field as would be the
118. 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. 2062 (1964).
119. 60 Stat. 919 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1964).
120. DEP'T. INTERIOR SYNPOSIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 41.
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direct issuance of preference to such people. This
dilemma is one common to public administrators.
To my mind affirmative action is the only solution.'21
C. "The National Interest": Its Broad Considerations
In the preceding section immediate and specific considerations for leasing policy formation were discussed. As was
noted, choices are available in each of these areas, and such
choices can be readily tested, adopted and changed, if necessary, during the forthcoming development of an oil shale
industry.
The present section will explore broader considerations
having to do with the general" national interest." Such issues
as are involved here are difficult to define and the policy
choices within them are often hard to evaluate.
The writer feels that some of these issues must underlie
the otherwise unexplained opposition which has so far prevented the development of oil shale. The future of oil shale
depends in large measure upon the frank and open discussion
of these issues. Once it can be shown that production of
shale oil is in the best national interest, then the major
obstacle to oil shale development will have been removed.
1.

Defense Needs and National Security

Captain K. C. Lovell, Director of Naval Petroleum and
Oil Shale Reserves, Department of Defense, says unequivocally... that the immediate development of oil shale is necessary for national security. Citing figures showing projected
increases in domestic demand and increased reliance on
foreign oil (an estimated 30 per cent from foreign sources
by 1983), he urges that development be commenced just as
soon as possible. It is clear that the new oil shale industry
cannot produce "instant oil." Humble Oil Company estimates
a lead time of from eight to ten years before facilities could
accomplish "on stream" production. 2 ' Thus, Captain Lovell
urges that to wait for war or a national emergency would
121. Mock, supra note 12, at 67.
122. Senate Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 3, at 64.
123. Reistle, supra note 1.
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be to wait too long before attempting to mobilize necessary
shale oil production.
2. Foreign Trade and the Control of Imports
As we noted in Part One, the State Department is committed to the expansion of foreign trade whenever such
expansion would not endanger the national security. It was
seen that Secretary of Interior Udall has recently indicated
his desire to increase the importation of foreign oil into
this country.
It is obvious that such importation of foreign oil has
a profound effect upon our domestic petroleum industry. It
may well be that those who oppose the development of oil
shale really do so because they favor an increase in the
importation of foreign oil.
But the strongest answer to those favoring increased
imports is that such a policy would only serve to worsen
the present balance-of-payments problem. Further, recent
months have witnessed a series of unsettling events in foreign oil-producing countries. The government of Indonesia
has recently taken over that country's major oil-production
and refining facilities, which had, until that time, been owned
and operated by American companies. " ' The government of
Venezuela has recently levied increased taxes on American
companies producing oil there. 25 These companies are being
rudely reminded that "the power to tax is the power to
destroy." In Libya, American companies have just undergone a difficult year. The Libyan government revised its
concession agreements with American companies and now
requires a significant increase in royalty payments.'
All of these events show a trend which indicates the
dangers to the United States inherent in its heavy reliance
upon foreign oil.
124. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 31, 1965, p. 6.
125. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6, 1966, p. 14.
126. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6, 1966, p. 14, Jan. 5, 1966, p. 9, Dec. 29, 1965,
p. 18. See also, "Mideast Oil: Big Supply, Little Savvy," Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 10.
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3. Control of the "Energy Mix"
Congress must consider future energy requirements and
the "energy mix" which would best meet these requirements.
But in planning for the future, Congress must scrupulously
avoid preferential treatment that constitutes a manipulation
of energy sources in disregard of the demands of the open
market. To do otherwise would be to engage in "end-use"
control.
Oil shale should be allowed to take its place, along with
other fuel sources, in providing for the Nation's future
needs. Atomic energy and coal" 7 are two other potentially
competitive sources of fuel. In the past the government has
given a great boost, through subsidies, to the atomic energy
industry. Some with a vested interest in securing a favored
position for nuclear power12 8 may be opposed to the development of oil shale. But the oil shale industry should not now
be prohibited from competing on equal terms with this and
other energy sources if a genuine need for the production
of shale oil can be shown.
4. Control of the Market
As was noted in Part One, Rostow, de Chazeau, Kahn,
and others are strongly critical of the petroleum industry
and its apparent enjoyment of freedom from government
regulation. They denounce in particular production control
by state prorationing statutes and what appears to be industry control over market prices.
Domestic exploration activity and domestic crude oil
reserves are at their lowest points since 1949.129 Now the
critics of the petroleum industry may find it convenient to
oppose the development of oil shale because they fear that
such development would allow for a revival of the domestic
petroleum industry.
127. Some oil companies are presently purchasing coal properties and developing
techniques for making gasoline from coal. See Wall Street Journal, Oct.
20, 1965, p. 1.
128. For instance, the TVA (which has evolved into a government power monopoly) has announced that it may build a nuclear power unit next year
"if the price is right." See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 4.
129. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6, 1966.
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But such fears are irrational and unfair. In the first
place, the oil shale industry should obviously be allowed to
develop on its own merits. In the second place, there are indications that it will be the mining and chemical industries,
and not petroleum, which will be most instrumental in the
development of oil shale. Private enterprise as a whole will
contribute new technology, new capital and new market
demands for the production of shale oil. Nothing prevents
the government from creating new answers and establishing
a workable relationship with private enterprise in this new
endeavor.
In regard to all these considerations involving the national interest, Byron Mock most recently said:
By the time the report [of the Oil Shale Advisory
Board] came out it seemed to me that we had resolved two questions. First, there was no public
interest that justified holding up an oil shale industry. As a consequence thereof there was no public
interest that necessitated indefinite delay of lifting the withdrawal on federal oil shale lands. The
second conclusion was that there were definable
public benefits to be achieved from opening the oil
shale reserves. 30
CONCLUSION

The requisites for the development of oil shale are clearly
present. Capital, technology and manpower await the "goahead." Only the formulation of a national oil shale policy
is lacking, and now Congress should provide for that lack.
Today the federal government holds a "monopoly" in
leasable oil shale lands. The legislation of leasing procedures
for these lands will, in effect, be a description of the terms
by which this monopoly will be exercised. The federal government in its capacity as oil shale landlord has the present
potentiality for becoming "Big Government" in the ugliest
sense of the word.
But this need not be the case. Congress, with the cooperation of the Department of the Interior and interested

representatives of private enterprise, has the authority and
130. Mock, supra note 12, p. 65.
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the ability to balance carefully the best interests of all parties
to the present oil shale controversy. If the balancing is properly done, a policy will be forthcoming which is "national "
rather than "federal" in character to the extent that it best
provides for the "national interest."
The basic question which confronts those who would
attempt to formulate a national policy for the development
of oil shale should not be whether the federal government
should reserve oil shale lands for public, as opposed to private,
'development. The capital expenditure for research and commercial production by the Colony Development Co. is evidence
that private enterprise is already committed to the economic
feasibility of private development. Further, in the light of
the traditional technological superiority of private industry
in this country, future shale oil production will best be done
by our private mining, chemical and petroleum industries.
To argue otherwise would be to make a basic departure from
the principles of capitalism.
The first basic policy question which must be answered
is, "When and under what terms for the 'distribution of revenues (i.e., income taxes, rents, royalties, bonuses, etc.) will
private industry be allowed to compete for the leasing of
publicly owned oil shale lands?" Boiled down, the question
becomes one of timing and of dollars. Ultimately, it is the
market place which will best determine the adequacy of the
answers given to this first policy question. For if the revenue
terms are set so as to prohibit the competition of shale oils
in the market place, or if leasing is not allowed at a time when
there is a market demand for the product, then the value of
this resource will have been lost and the national interest
defeated.
The second basic policy question concerns government
control. Assuming that the first policy question has been
answered by the implementation of competitive leasing procedures and fair revenue distribution terms, then the remaining policy question asks, "Under what forms and degrees
of government control will the production of oil shale be
allowed?" Here the national interest is not so susceptible
to testing in the market place. For here government controls
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will affect such areas as conservation, national security, social
well-being and world peace - areas where an economic evaluation is often impossible. The success or failure of the national
policy touching these areas will only ultimately be tested by
historical judgment.
The 'days of the free-miner tradition have passed. In
1935,'. the last of the public domain in the United States
was closed to entry prior to classification under the homestead laws. Thus was marked the passing of the American
Frontier, an institution which had been celebrated by Frederick Jackson Turner and his disciples as the "world's greatest
its passing was a sign
instrument of democracy." To others,
13 2
that "America had come of age."1
The formulation and carrying forward of a national
oil shale policy could well evoke like reactions in the days
ahead. To some, it may spell the end of "freedom" within
the oil industry. Others may recognize it as a new industry's
"coming of age." But no matter what the reaction to that
policy may be, its determination is best left to the legislative
forum. While it can be said that a political and economic
climate favorable to the development of oil shale has been
lacking in the past, it is hoped that such a climate is now
improving. No one of the numerous administrative problems
confronting the development of oil shale are insoluble. There
are none for which early answers cannot be given. Apparently
all that has been lacking is sufficient impetus within the
federal government to move from dead center in seeking
these answers. It is only suggested now that the Congress
get to the task at hand. Otherwise the twenty-first century
and the discovery of new energy sources will be upon us
and this vast national asset will have been left wasting in
the ground where it is of benefit to no man.
[Ed. note. The basic research for Mr. Dominick's article was
done early in 1966. The author informs that since that time
By Executive Orders of Franklin Roosevelt, Nov. 26, 1934, and Feb. 5,
1935, based upon authority for such withdrawal found in the Act of
June 25, 1910, established a National Conservation Program (36 Stat. 961
Coupled with the above mentioned Executive Orders was the
(1910)).
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1269 as amended (1934), 43 U.S.C.
§ 315 (1964)).
132. ROBBINS, OuR LANDED HERITAGE 423 (1962).
131.
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some significant developments have occurred with respect to
a national oil shale policy. These developments are:
1. Further increases in oil importation allowances were
made by Secretary of the Interior Udall in September, 1966.
2. Foreign governments in recent months have increased
their demands upon American producing companies for higher royalty, tax and concession payments on foreign produced
oil. In November, 1966, Mi.d-East governments threatened
complete confiscation of United States oil facilities.
3. There has been increased interest in the feasibility of
in-situ retorting of shale oil by underground nuclear explosion. This interest is being carried forward by the Bureau
of Mines (see Oil and Gas Journal, August 15, 1966, p. 44),
the Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives of the Atomic
Energy Commission and a joint venture of some fifteen private companies. In 1966, the 89th Congress appropriated
about $1.5 million for a similar AEC project in New Mexico
called "Gasbuggy."
There is now expectation for nuclear
testing in oil shale lands in the near future.
4. Two potentially valuable minerals were recently discovered in conjunction with oil shale 'deposits. Nacholite, a
sodium carbonate, and Dawsonite, a potential ore of aluminum, are now being investigated for marketability by private
companies. This effort has been somewhat hampered by the
fact that the Department of Interior has so far refused to
specify whether Dawsonite is leaseable under the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920, or locatable under the Mining Act of
1872, and if locatable, whether by placer or by lode claim.
Private industry awaits that determination. In the meantime, these discoveries point up the necessity for a comprehensive national oil shale policy which would put to most
advantageous use all of the related minerals of the western
oil shale lands.]
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